Addendum: Comments and Corrections

We will be sharing updates and comments as events unfold or where corrections and additional context merit inclusion. Rather than revise the original text, these updates will be shared here as a short addendum, both for transparency and because the developments they point to — particularly on the legislative front — continue to unfold in real time. Further comments are still coming in, so this addendum is a working document, to be updated as additional input arrives rather than closed off at a single point in time.

Response to Comments: 20 September 2026

The additions so far fall into three areas. First, a factual correction on the scope of the EU-Israel Association Agreement, which the report's own analysis had already got right in substance but not in every reference. Second, a fuller account of the breadth of expert and elite mobilisation on this issue than the original draft captured, including a correction to the number of signatories on the Die Zeit letter and additional detail on parallel statements by former European officials that did not make it into the initial version. Third, a legislative development in Germany — a Bundesrat-tabled bill before the Bundestag that would criminalise public statements questioning Israel's right to exist — which was not yet prominent enough in the public record at the time of writing to warrant inclusion, but which is significant enough to note now ahead of its expected autumn debate.

None of this changes the report's core argument. If anything, the fuller picture of civil-society and elite mobilisation strengthens it, while the pending legislation is a useful reminder that the political terrain it describes remains in motion. Further comments and corrections will continue to be folded in as they arrive.

Association Agreement wording: It should be noted that only certain elements of the EU-Israel Association Agreement can be suspended by qualified majority, not the Agreement in its entirety, as the report itself correctly states elsewhere.

On German public opinion and civil-society mobilisation. Beyond the handful of mainstream media pieces cited in the report, the shift in German public opinion, particularly among younger people, is arguably better traced through the more vibrant discussion taking place on social media and podcasts, which reaches audiences the traditional press no longer commands. Within elite and expert circles, this mobilisation has been considerably broader than the report suggests. The widely cited letter in Die Zeit was in fact signed by thirteen former German ambassadors, not four, and it should be read alongside a wider pattern: between July 2025 and July 2026, a group of former European ambassadors and senior officials issued eight separate public statements, including an op-ed signed by seven former European Prime Ministers and senior ministers including former German Vice-Chancellor Sigmar Gabriel. That op-ed did reach the German press, if not Die Zeit or the other key outlets referenced in the report, and points to a depth of establishment concern that the current draft understates.

On the intellectual reframing of "Staatsräson." The "Beyond Staatsräson" initiative deserves greater weight in terms of both conceptual depth and the standing of its authors and represents a more substantial intervention than the Seibert interview suggests. "Beyond Staatsräson" engages directly with the intellectual and historical foundations of Germany's post-war relationship to Israel, and its rearticulation of that doctrine is likely to have more lasting influence on the terms of the debate.

On the legislative dimension. A legislative development now working its way through the German system also deserves mention: a piece of legislation tabled by the Bundesrat before the Bundestag that would criminalise public statements questioning Israel's right to exist is expected to be debated in Parliament this autumn. This marks a potential hardening of the legal environment around the debate and sits in tension with the shifts in public and elite opinion described elsewhere in the report; it deserves mention alongside the correction, noted separately, that only certain elements of the EU-Israel Association Agreement — not the Agreement in its entirety — can be suspended by qualified majority.

The statements by the European ambassadors and senior officials can be accessed by visiting: **https://euformeramb.eu**